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TROLL OR NO TROLL?  POLICING PATENT 
USAGE WITH AN OPEN POST-GRANT REVIEW 
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ABSTRACT 
In December 2004, a mystery business, JGR Acquisitions Inc., 
purchased the patent portfolio of bankrupt Commerce One at 
auction.  Commerce One had not previously enforced the acquired 
patents and many companies were using the patented technologies 
at the time of the auction.  Patent watchdog groups argued that 
JGR—a potential patent troll formed solely to purchase Commerce 
One’s patents—should not be able to use the patents as a vehicle to 
extract licensing fees and that the patents should lapse into the 
public domain.  Under current law, however, there is no provision 
for patents to be invalidated merely because they are used in a 
manner that discourages innovation. This iBrief argues that in 
order to keep patent trolls from stifling innovation and to protect 
legitimate patent holders, the Patent and Trademark Office should 
require an open post-grant review whenever patents are renewed 
or sold.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Intellectual property development is surging in the United States 
and nowhere is this more evident than in the field of patents.2  Currently, 
patents are being granted on a variety of inventions ranging from online 
shopping carts3 to cantilever-free magnetic resonance force microscopes.4  
At the same time patents are being granted on a wider range of inventions, 
the potential uses for granted patents are expanding beyond the traditional 
applications.5  Historically, patents were issued to “increase the incentive to 
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate, 2006, Duke University School of Law; M.S., 2003, B.S., 2002, 
in Mechanical Engineering, Brigham Young University.  The author would like 
to thank Professor Arti K. Rai for her comments. 
2 See, e.g. NAT’L  RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT 
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 28 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) 
[hereinafter “A PATENT SYSTEM”], available at 
http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf. 
3 U.S. Patent No. 5,715,314 (issued Feb. 3, 1998) (the name of the patent is 
“Network sales system”); see ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION’S PATENT BUSTING PROJECT, at http://www.eff.com/patent/ (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2005) [hereinafter “PATENT BUSTING PROJECT”]. 
4 U.S. Patent No. 6,836,112 (issued Dec. 28, 2004). 
5 See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 31. 
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invent by conferring the right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling the invention in exchange for foregoing secrecy by publishing the 
invention, making the information available for others to build upon.”6  
Today, however, individuals and firms are purchasing patents in order to 
strategically enforce the inventor’s rights.7  
¶2 One form of strategic enforcement encompasses purchasing a patent 
for the sole purpose of receiving licensing fees.8   This type of 
enforcement—potentially a case of patent trolling—may  have been JGR 
Acquisitions Inc.’s (JGR) goal when it purchased Commerce One’s patent 
portfolio.  Commerce One was founded in 1994 and its focus was on 
developing electronic commerce software applications.9  The company 
encountered financial difficulties, however, and was forced to sell a number 
of its patents at a bankruptcy auction.  The seven patents and thirty-two 
patent applications Commerce One sold covered a broad spectrum of 
electronic communication and web service technologies and standards.10 
The technologies these patents covered remain widely used by companies 
such as IBM and Microsoft.11 
¶3  On December 6, 2004, JGR purchased the rights to the patented 
technologies for $15.5 million at the bankruptcy auction.12  Interestingly, 
JGR was incorporated on December 1, 2004,13 possibly for the sole purpose 
of purchasing the Commerce One patents.14  While JGR’s owners remain 
unknown, some have speculated that IBM and Microsoft were involved.15 
¶4 Jason Schultz of the Electronic Frontier Foundation stated, “[t]hese 
patents, in the wrong hands, would be used to shake down any companies 
that operate in Web services and use standards.”16  One of the inventors 
                                                     
6 Id. at 35. 
7 See id. at 31, 35. 
8 A traditional use would be to purchase the patent in order to use the technology 
and receive licensing fees.  See generally id. at 31-38. 
9 John Markoff, Auction of Internet Commerce Patents Draws Concern, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, at C4. 
10 Renee Boucher Ferguson, Commerce One Auctioned Off; Will Patents be 
Used for Commercial Gain?, EWEEK, Dec. 13, 2004, at 24. 
11 Markoff, supra note 9. 
12  Victoria Slind-Flor, Who Done It?; At a Patent Auction in December, a 
Mysterious Bidder Takes Home a $15.5 Million Patent Portfolio, 5 IP L. & BUS., 
Jan. 5, 2005, at 14. 
13 Ferguson, supra note 10. 
14 See Slind-Flor, supra note 12 (describing several companies which were 
formed solely for the purpose of bidding on the patents or used names 
specifically established for the auction). 
15 Id.  (IBM declined any involvement with JGR, but Microsoft declined to 
comment).   
16 Ferguson, supra note 10. 
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named on the patents, Robert Glushko, believed the patents should no 
longer be enforceable.17  He claimed Commerce One intended to create a 
public standard with the patents and not restrict public use of the 
technologies.18 Given the clear intentions of the inventors, Glushko believes 
the patented technologies may actually have lapsed into the public 
domain.19  
¶5 In order to prevent potential licensing terrorism20—strategically 
enforcing patents intended for public use—and to provide stability and 
predictability for inventors using the patent system, new legislation 
modifying the Patent Act21 is necessary.  The Patent Quality Assistance Act 
(PQAA),22 introduced in November of 2004, would modify the Patent Act 
“to improve patent quality, deter abusive practices by unscrupulous patent 
holders, and provide meaningful, low-cost alternatives to litigation for 
challenging the patent validity” through a post-grant review procedure.23 
This iBrief proposes another aspect of a post-grant review that would 
prevent patented technology from being exploited by patent trolls and 
protect legitimate patent holders.  Specifically, the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) should review patents in two situations: (1) at the time when 
the renewal fee for a patent is due and (2) anytime a patent is sold.  Part I 
demonstrates the adverse effects of patent trolls on the patent system and 
presents a situation where seemingly troll-like behavior is nonetheless 
desirable.  Part II explains the legal principles an open review would be 
founded upon, addresses procedural aspects of an open review, and applies 
an open review procedure to two real-world examples. 
I. PERNICIOUS PATENT TROLLS OR LEGITIMATE PATENT 
ENFORCERS? 
¶6 In order to understand the desirability and benefits of an open 
review, it is necessary to define both the type of behavior the open review 
would prohibit and the type of behavior it would continue to allow.  Ideally, 
the open review would limit patent enforcement by patent trolls while 
protecting the patent enforcement of legitimate patent holders. 
                                                     
17 Slind-Flor, supra note 12. 
18 Markoff, supra note 9. 
19 Id. 
20 See Jason Schultz, When Dot-Com Patents Go Bad, SALON.COM, Dec. 13, 
2004 (comparing this type of licensing to cold war terrorism), at 
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2004/12/13/patent_reform/. 
21 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000). 
22 Patent Quality Assistance Act of 2004, H.R. 5299, 108th Cong. (2004). 
23 150 Cong. Rec. E1935 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2004) (statement of Rep. Berman).  
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A. Patent Trolls Deter Innovation 
¶7 There are two types of patent trolls: individuals and corporations.  
An individual patent troll is a patent holder who receives a patent and then 
secretly waits for another inventor to develop the same technology.24  When 
this happens, the troll appears and demands licensing fees for the use of the 
patented technology. The troll, however, never markets the technology or 
makes expenditures to develop the invention.25  He merely waits for the 
industry to grow up around the patent so he can then extract licensing fees 
from the unsuspecting infringers.  Similarly, corporate patent trolls purchase 
patents and do not enforce them until the relevant industry has grown up 
around the patent.  Some commentators have described corporate patent 
trolls as “patent system bottom feeders” who buy “improvidently-granted 
patents from distressed companies for the sole purpose of suing legitimate 
businesses.”26 
¶8 The National Research Council of the National Academies lists four 
effects patent trolls have on innovation and competition: 
(1) In contrast to incentives to genuine innovation, patents on trivial 
innovations may confer market power or allow firms to use legal 
resources aggressively as a competitive weapon without consumer 
benefit. (2) Poor patents could encourage more charges of 
infringement and litigation, raising transaction costs. (3) The 
proliferation of low-quality patents in a technology complicates and 
raises the cost of licensing or avoiding infringement. (4) The 
uncertainty about the validity of previously issued patents may deter 
investment in innovation and/or distort its direction.27
¶9 A further deterrence to investment in innovation occurs when trolls 
purchase patents which have not previously been enforced and suddenly 
begin enforcing them.28  This deterrence could potentially occur in the case 
                                                     
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Patent Quality Improvement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Courts, the 
Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 198th 
Cong. 21 (2003) (quoted in Mark D. Janis, Ideas into Action: Implementing 
Reform of the Patent System: Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The 
“Dubious Preponderance”, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, n.1 (2004) 
[hereinafter Janis I]). 
27 A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 95. 
28 This deterrence to innovation is the motivation for the type of open review 
proposed here.  The current proposals for an open review are motivated by 
validity concerns—not by how valid patents have been used.  See, e.g., id. at 6-7 
(“The grounds for a challenge could be any of the statutory standards—novelty, 
utility, non-obviousness, disclosure or enablement—or even the case law 
proscription on patenting abstract ideas and natural phenomena”); FED. TRADE 
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of the Commerce One patents, which up until the bankruptcy auction had 
never been enforced.  Companies infringing a troll’s technology probably 
do so because they are unaware of the patent or believe they have 
permission to use the technology.   
¶10 Under the current patent system, when a troll begins enforcing his 
patent, companies who are using the troll’s technology are virtually 
compelled to pay a licensing fee because a finding of infringement would 
result in the automatic issuance of a permanent injunction and other 
penalties.29  The PQAA would allow courts to weigh all the equities 
involved in order to determine whether or not a permanent injunction 
against the alleged infringer is proper.30  However, this might not be 
sufficient deterrence for troll-like behavior because the costs of litigation 
are often greater than the licensing fees the troll requests.31  Because 
litigation is not a sufficient deterrent for patent trolls, an effective, low cost 
alternative is needed.  An open review would provide such an alternative.  
B. Some Troll-Like Behavior is Necessary to Protect Legitimate 
Patent Enforcers 
¶11 While an open review would eliminate most current troll-like 
behavior, it must not be so severely tailored as to impose significant 
additional costs on legitimate patent purchasers.  In some cases patent 
holders lack the resources to apply their patented technology and enforce 
their patent rights.  An open review must be sufficiently flexible to allow 
other entities interested in utilizing the patented technology to acquire the 
patent rights and enforce them.   
                                                                                                                       
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, Executive Summary at 7-8 (2003) [hereinafter 
FTC REPORT] (“At a minimum, patent challengers should be able to raise issues 
of novelty, nonobviousness, written description, enablement, and utility.”), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
29 A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 6-7. 
30 See id.; H.R. 5299, 108th Cong. § 6 (2004) (“Grounds for Granting Injunction 
– A court shall not grant an injunction under this section unless it finds that the 
patentee is likely to suffer irreparable harm that cannot be remedied by payment 
of money damages.  In making or rejecting such a finding, the court shall not 
presume the existence of irreparable harm, but rather the court shall consider 
and weigh evidence, if any, tending to establish or negate any equitable factor 
relevant to a determination of the existence of irreparable harm, including, but 
not limited to, the extent to which the patentee makes use of the technology 
claimed by the patent.”). 
31 See, e.g., Timothy Aeppel  Patent Dispute Embroils Host of Industries, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 21, 2004, at B1 (citing several companies who have decided to pay 
licensing fees for an allegedly illegitimate patent because the licensing fee is 
much less than potential litigation costs). 
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¶12 The desirability of such patent purchases is demonstrated by the 
conditions surrounding Eli Whitney’s cotton gin.  Whitney received a patent 
for the cotton gin in 1794.32  Prior to Whitney’s invention, one farm worker 
could produce one pound of cotton lint per day by hand.  However, with the 
advent of the cotton gin, one worker was able to produce nearly fifty times 
that amount.33  Before Whitney invented the gin, the South was exporting 
487,000 pounds of cotton to England per year.  One year after the cotton 
gin, that number increased to 1.6 million pounds.34  By the time Whitney 
died in 1825, cotton exports to England alone reached 171 million pounds.35  
In 1850, Thomas Macaulay noted, “What Peter the Great did to make 
Russia dominant, Eli Whitney’s invention of the gin has more than equaled 
in its relation to the power and progress of the United States.”36  The cotton 
gin was a useful, novel and nonobvious invention, meeting the criteria for 
patentability. 
¶13 Despite the commercial success of the gin, however, Whitney had 
trouble enforcing his exclusive rights to the invention.  By 1804 Whitney 
had filed sixty patent infringement suits in Georgia alone, but had been 
unsuccessful in all of these actions.37  In response to the rampant 
infringement Whitney said, “I have a set of the most Depraved villains to 
combat and I might almost as well go to Hell in search of Happiness as 
apply to a Georgia-Court for Justice.”38 
¶14 Scientific progress was accomplished in granting Whitney the 
patent on the cotton gin because he was required to disclose the invention.  
This disclosure enabled society, as well as scores of infringers, to benefit 
from the technology.  However, innovation was stifled because Whitney 
had little time to invent anything else while pursuing the pointless 
litigation.39  In any case, if Whitney had ever invented something else, he 
would not have likely applied for a patent, but instead relied on trade secret 
laws to protect his interests.  Thus, in the case of the cotton gin, the goal of 
the Patent Act to incentivize future innovation was not achieved. 
¶15 While it is possible that another individual with greater resources 
than Whitney would have been no more effective at obtaining favorable 
                                                     
32 Stephen Yafa, The Man Who Made Cotton King, INVENTION & TECH., Winter 
2005, at 50-51. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 57. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 53. 
37 Id. at 51. 
38 Id. at 52 (emphasis in original). 
39 Id.at 57.  By the end of his life, Whitney had turned to musket manufacturing, 
and helped contribute to the idea of mass marketing with interchangeable parts.   
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judgments in court,40 a more skillful and powerful negotiator could have 
obtained some licensing fees from infringers.  Because Whitney was 
legitimately trying to enforce his patent rights, and the infringers knew he 
doing so, he should have been allowed to sell his patent and recover his 
investment.  The purchase price would have provided Whitney a portion of 
the economic benefit derived from his invention and created the incentive 
for him to invent again. 
¶16 The cotton gin and other similar examples show why there should 
be no blanket rule that one person cannot acquire and enforce another’s 
patent.  Not every patent acquirer who enforces a patent is a patent troll.  
Anyone who purchased the cotton gin patent would not have been doing 
anything unexpected by continuing to pursue licensing fees from people 
who were infringing the cotton gin.  In such situations, the incentive to 
invent grows because inventors realize that if they are not successful in 
enforcing their patents, the patents still might have some value as a salable 
business product. 
¶17 One major difference between the cotton gin hypothetical and 
Commerce One’s patent auction is in the public’s perception of the patented 
technology prior to the sale.  In the case of the cotton gin, cotton farmers 
knew they were using the cotton gin technology against the wishes of Eli 
Whitney.41  However, in the case of the Commerce One patents, the public 
expected to have free use of the technology covered by the Commerce One 
patents based on communications by the inventors.42  Given these 
differences, one issue that should be addressed in assessing the propriety of 
patent purchases is whether the public can reasonably expect the original 
patent holder to enforce his patent at the time of the sale?  If yes, then the 
patent purchaser is justified in enforcing the patent, but if no, then the 
purchaser should not be able to enforce the patent.  Innovation is 
unjustifiably stifled if people who had been legally using patented 
technology to produce new technology may no longer do so—or can use it 
only after paying significant licensing fees. 
¶18 Admittedly, in the cotton gin example commercial success might 
have been stifled had another party suddenly been successful in enforcing 
the patents,43 but the infringers were on notice of their actions. Whatever 
commercial success the infringers lost would have been justified by the 
purpose of the Patent Act.44  If the exclusive rights guaranteed by the Patent 
                                                     
40 See id. at 52.  It appears the Georgia courts were set on denying Whitney, or 
anyone else, rights associated with the cotton gin patent. 
41 See id. 
42 See Markoff, supra note 9. 
43 Processing cotton today employs substantially the same process as invented 
by Whitney in 1794.  See . Yafa, supra note 32, at 54, 56. 
44 See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 35. 
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Act become unstable or uncertain, initial inventions, such as the cotton gin, 
would not be available for subsequent improvements.  Ultimately, 
innovation will suffer.45 
II. GETTING RID OF THE TROLL AND PROTECTING THE LEGITIMATE 
ENFORCER THROUGH AN OPEN REVIEW 
¶19 In order to prevent patent trolls from deterring innovation and 
protect legitimate patent enforcers, an open post-grant review should be 
available as an alternative to costly litigation. Patent trolls should be unable 
to capitalize on market uncertainty by allowing others to unknowingly 
develop infringing technologies while waiting in the wings to subsequently 
appear and extract licensing fees. At the same time, as demonstrated in the 
previous section, a patentee should be able to sell his patent rights in certain 
situations and the purchaser should be able to enforce the patentee’s rights.  
The best way to achieve this balance is to introduce legislation requiring the 
PTO to conduct an open review of a patent whenever a patent is renewed or 
sold. 
A. Open Review Based on the Equitable Principles of Laches and 
Estoppel 
¶20 Because the most effective way to currently challenge a 
questionable patent is through costly litigation, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has recommended “an administrative procedure for 
post-grant review and opposition that allows for meaningful challenges to 
patent validity short of federal court litigation.”46  The FTC’s review would 
be substantially broader than the current inter-partes reexamination 
provided for in the Patent Act.47  It would allow a challenger to at least 
challenge novelty, nonobviousness, written description, enablement, and 
utility.48  The FTC’s review would be much shorter than current litigation 
                                                     
45 See FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Executive Summary at 1-3. 
46 Id. at 7-8. 
47 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-18 (2000).  For a general critique of the inter-partes 
proceeding, see Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 481 (2000) [hereinafter Janis II].  Janis says, 
“To put it pointedly, inter partes reexamination is a dog.  Its substantive scope is 
too narrow, its procedural assurances of meaningful third-party participation are 
questionably, its appeal provisions are too limited, and its estoppel provisions 
are excessive.”  Id. at 498. 
48 FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Executive Summary at 8 n.26; see also A 
PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 6-7 (“The grounds for a challenge could be 
any of the statutory standards—novelty, utility, non-obviousness, disclosure or 
enablement—or even the case law proscription on patenting abstract ideas and 
natural phenomena.”). 
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and would also provide a wider range of remedies than courts currently 
provide.49 
¶21 While the FTC’s review is certainly a step in the right direction, the 
open review proposed by this iBrief would not focus on statutory validity, 
but instead on equitable validity.  This system would allow challenges to 
patent validity based on how a patent had been used. Such an open review 
would be based on two equitable principles which are currently affirmative 
defenses to patent infringement claims: laches50 and estoppel.51   
¶22 The seminal United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
case A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co.52 discusses the 
current state of the law regarding laches and estoppel in patent infringement 
actions.53  Aukerman owned patents covering a method and device used in 
pouring concrete highway barriers.54  Chaides purchased one of the devices 
and was informed by Aukerman in 1979 that it needed to sign a license 
agreement for the method patent.55  Chaides responded that Aukerman 
could sue if it wished but the amount of damages would be low and not 
worth Aukerman’s time.56  Aukerman took no further action until 1987 
when it learned that Chaides was a competitor of one of its licensees.57  
Aukerman subsequently filed an infringement action against Chaides in 
                                                     
49 See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 95-96, 98 (Patent litigation typically 
does not occur until seven to ten years after the patent is granted, and might take 
up to three years to complete.  An open proceeding could be resolved in as little 
as one year.). 
50 “1. Unreasonable delay in pursuing a right or claim—almost always an 
equitable one—in a way that prejudices the party against whom relief is sought. 
. . . 2. The equitable doctrine by which a court denies relief to a claimant who 
has unreasonably delayed in asserting the claim, when that delay has prejudiced 
the party against whom relief is sought.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 
2004). 
51 “1. A bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that contradicts 
what one has said or done before or what has been legally established as true. . . 
. 3. An affirmative defense alleging good-faith reliance on a misleading 
representation and an injury or detrimental change in position resulting from that 
reliance.”  Id. 
52 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
53 See John B. Campbell, A Decade of Aukerman: An Analysis of Laches and 
Estoppel in the Federal Circuit, 43 IDEA 299 (2003) (discussing Aukerman and 
how the Federal Circuit has applied it). 
54 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1026. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 1026-27. 
57 Id. at 1027. 
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1988.58  In defense of its actions, Chaides raised the defenses of laches and 
estoppel. 
1.  Laches 
¶23 The Federal Circuit held that where laches is established no claim 
for damages exists prior to the filing of the lawsuit.59  Where a patentee 
delays bringing a lawsuit for six years laches is presumed, but before six 
years there is no presumption.60  A presumption of laches only forces the 
patentee to come forward with some evidence showing he did not 
unreasonably delay a claim for relief. The defendant still has the burden of 
persuasion for the affirmative defense.61 
¶24 Courts weigh all the equities to determine if laches should bar pre-
filing damages.62  Two factors a court may consider include “(1) whether 
the plaintiff delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length 
of time from the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known 
of its claim against the defendant and (2) whether the delay operated to the 
prejudice or injury of the defendant.”63 
¶25 If laches is established, the patent holder cannot receive damages 
prior to the filing of the lawsuit.64  The patent holder may, however, receive 
an injunction against future acts of infringement and damages resulting 
from that infringement once the lawsuit is filed.65  The injunction does not 
carry over to infringing products the defendant sold before the lawsuit was 
filed—those products essentially receive a free license.66 
¶26 Ultimately a court will weigh all the equities to determine whether 
the delay by the plaintiff was unreasonable and inexcusable.  In Aukerman, 
a delay of nine years was not held to be inexcusable because the Federal 
Circuit determined the district court had failed to properly allocate the 
burden of proof.67   In other cases, however, a delay as short as three years 
has been found unreasonable and inexcusable.68 
2.  Estoppel 
                                                     
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1028. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  See Campbell, supra note 53, at 311-13 for a more in depth discussion of 
how the presumption of laches can be overcome. 
62 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028. 
63 Id. at 1032 (quoting Costello v. United States, 356 U.S. 265, 282 (1961)). 
64 Cambell, supra note 53, at 306. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 311. 
67 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1039. 
68 Campbell, supra note 53, at 311. 
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¶27 The Federal Circuit held that the defendant in a patent suit must 
establish the following three factors by a preponderance of the evidence in 
order to succeed on an estoppel claim:69 
a. The patentee, through misleading conduct, leads the alleged 
infringer to reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to 
enforce its patent against the alleged infringer.  “Conduct” may 
include specific statements, action, inaction, or silence where there 
was an obligation to speak. 
b. The alleged infringer relies on that conduct. 
c. Due to its reliance, the alleged infringer will be materially 
prejudiced if the patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim.70
¶28 A patentee’s conduct is misleading when he indicates to infringers 
that he does not intend to enforce his patent.  Unlike laches, where the 
standard is “knew or reasonably should have known,”71 a patentee must 
have actually been aware of the infringement for the infringer to succeed 
with an estoppel defense.72  The patentee need not intend to mislead, but he 
must communicate in some way that he will not enforce the patent against 
the infringer.73  In order for an estoppel claim to succeed, the infringer must 
demonstrate he reasonably relied on this misleading communication; it is 
not enough to simply prove the communication occurred.74  
¶29 In Aukerman, the court held that summary judgment for Chaides 
was inappropriate because there was an issue of fact as to whether 
“Aukerman’s course of conduct reasonably gave rise to an inference in 
Chaides that Aukerman was not going to enforce the . . . patents against 
Chaides.”75  Although the length of Aukerman’s delay in filing suit favored 
the inference that Aukerman was not going to enforce the patents, other 
evidence was not as favorable.76  For example, Chaides might have thought 
Aukerman did not file suit because the amount of potential damages was 
less than the cost of litigation; however this was not the same as giving up 
the right to enforce the patents.77 
                                                     
69 Id. at 307. 
70 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028. 
71 Id. at 1032. 
72 Campbell, supra note 53, at 308. 
73 Id. at 308. 
74 Id. at 309. 
75 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1043. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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B. Procedural Aspects of the Open Review 
¶30 The open review proposed here78 would occur whenever a patent is 
sold or a patent holder is required to pay maintenance fees to retain his 
patent rights.79  The party who purchases the patent would be responsible to 
pay for the review and the patent holder80 would have the initial burden of 
coming forth with some evidence showing active use and enforcement of 
the patent. 
¶31 If the patent holder or purchaser does not satisfy the burden of 
coming forth with some evidence of valid enforcement, the patent would be 
declared invalid and the technology would enter the public domain.81  If, 
however, the patent holder or purchaser satisfies the burden of production, 
the PTO would issue a public notice and allow third parties, for a limited 
time period, to submit contrary evidence which the PTO would review.  If 
the PTO decides the evidence is sufficient to challenge the assertion of 
active enforcement, it would give the challengers the option to initiate an 
adverse proceeding between the patentee and any challengers.  Only then, if 
the challengers decide to proceed, would the identity of the challengers be 
made known to the patentee.82 
¶32 The proceeding would be similar to a declaratory judgment action 
of invalidity and the challengers would have the burden of proof.83  The 
challengers would be required to prove elements similar to those of laches 
and estoppel discussed above.  However, instead of being elements of an 
affirmative defense, they would become the elements of the challenger’s 
                                                     
78 The section deals with procedural aspects unique to the open review proposed 
here (as opposed to the FTC review or the review proposed by the NRC) unless 
otherwise noted. 
79 A patent holder must pay a maintenance fee following the third, seventh and 
eleventh years after a patent has issued.  A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 31.  
If the maintenance fees are not paid, the patent expires and the technology 
becomes part of the public domain.  See id. 
80 Either the patentee or the patent purchaser would pay for the review. 
81 The PTO already lists all patents on its website (http://www.uspto.gov/).  A 
listing of expired patents—those which were not renewed at the appropriate 
time—and those patents which are invalidated through the open review could 
also be listed. 
82 A challenger might refrain from presenting important evidence to the PTO to 
prevent the patentee from knowing of a possible infringer.  Anonymity until the 
PTO decides there is a triable issue would help to alleviate some of this concern.  
This is discussed further below. 
83 For a discussion of the current presumption of validity in patent infringement 
actions and an argument that the burden of proof should be relaxed from a clear 
and convincing standard to a preponderance standard, see Janis I, supra note 26. 
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cause of action.  The two factors for laches84 and the three factors for 
estoppel85 would be taken into account; yet, the claims would retain their 
equitable nature and allow the judge to consider all elements of the case. 
¶33 Similar to other proposed third-party reviews, the proceeding would 
be held in front of an administrative patent judge who would have greater 
legal training than most patent examiners.86  The FTC and the National 
Research Council of the National Academies have written detailed 
descriptions of the procedural aspects of such an open review.87 
¶34  The additional cost associated with the open review could be 
reflected in the purchase price of the patent.  Depending on the 
circumstances, these additional costs may reduce the purchase price of the 
patent, making the sale less desirable in the eyes of the patent seller.  It 
would also make the patent buyer more cautious in determining which 
patents to buy.  If a potential buyer knows he will have to go through an 
open review, the buyer would likely only purchase patents that have a high 
likelihood of surviving the review.  Also, when a patent is up for renewal, if 
the patentee knows he has not been enforcing the patent, it would be 
unlikely he would try to renew it.  This would help to reduce troll-like 
behavior for both patentees and patent purchasers. 
¶35 The open review proposed here presents advantages over other 
proposed third-party reviews. Current proposals for an open review first 
require third parties to come forward with evidence to challenge statutory 
validity.88  However, there is a significant drawback to third-party-initiated 
proceedings: if the challenger looses in front of the PTO, the patent holder 
is alerted to a potential infringer—a losing challenger is essentially 
“’paint[ing] big targets on [himself]’ by actively opposing others’ 
patents.”89 The current proposals by the FTC and the National Research 
Council of the National Academies provide for appellate review with the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and Federal Circuit,90 but a 
challenger might still be wary of an adverse result on appeal and subsequent 
                                                     
84 See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
85 See id. at 1028. 
86 See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 97-98 (giving a detailed listing of the 
process involved in a third-party review); FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5, 
at 17. 
87 See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 95-103; FTC REPORT, supra note 28, 
Chp. 5, at 15-23. 
88 See A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 97. 
89 FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5, at 18. 
90 A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 101; FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5, 
at 17. 
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lawsuits.91  PTO Director Q. Todd Dickinson supports such a review 
procedure, but says independent inventors fear competitors will use these 
proceedings to “impede their ability to assert their patents.”92  The open 
review proposed here would alleviate some of these concerns by allowing 
third parties to wait until the PTO initiates the open review. 
¶36 To further alleviate concerns of third parties becoming “big 
targets,”93 the submissions from third parties could be anonymous to protect 
concerns about subsequent litigation.94  The identity of the challenger would 
not be made known to the patentee until the PTO determines there is an 
issue.  Some have proposed allowing the challenger to re-litigate issues in a 
subsequent infringement action if the challenger is unsuccessful in front of 
the PTO; the challenger would only be estopped from re-litigating the issues 
if he decides to appeal the PTO’s decision to the Federal Circuit.95 
C. Application of an Open Review to Commerce One and the Cotton 
Gin 
¶37 A general analysis of the open review proposed here can be made 
with regards to the Commerce One and cotton gin examples.96   First 
addressing the Commerce One patents, JGR would pay the sale fee to the 
PTO and present any evidence that Commerce One had been enforcing its 
patents and looking for potential infringers.  Currently, it does not appear 
any such evidence exists because companies like IBM and Microsoft have 
been using the technologies97 based on communications from Commerce 
One.  Aware of this burden, it is possible that JGR would not have paid so 
much for, or even purchased, the patents in the first place.   
¶38 Companies using the patented technology would then present 
evidence concerning their usage after the PTO issued a public notice of the 
                                                     
91 See FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5, at 16, 18. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 18. 
94 The currently available inter-partes reexamination procedure is rarely used 
because there are several estoppel provisions that restrict challengers’ rights to 
relitigate issues after an adverse decision by the PTO.  See A PATENT SYSTEM, 
supra note 2, at 96; see generally Janis II, supra note 47 (discussing the different 
estoppel provisions). 
95 See FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5, at 17. 
96 The open review would be similar procedurally to those reviews proposed by 
the FTC and the National Research Council of the National Academies.  See A 
PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 95-103; FTC REPORT, supra note 28, Chp. 5, 
at 15-23. 
97 See Markoff, supra note 9. 
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sale.98  Evidence of usage would include the length of time the companies 
had been using the patented technology and other relevant factors 
concerning the inventor’s intent for the patent.  For example, Robert 
Glushko’s statements relating Commerce One’s intent not to restrict public 
use of his patents would be introduced. 99  The PTO would then make a 
determination whether or not to allow the infringing companies to pursue an 
adversarial adjudication of the patents’ validity. 
¶39 At trial, the challenging companies would need to prove the 
elements of laches and estoppel discussed in the previous section.  
Regarding laches, they would call employees of Commerce One, like 
Glushko, to testify that they knew of the infringements, but had no desire to 
pursue litigation because they wanted the public to use the patented 
technologies.  This would likely be dispositive of the first factor of laches—
delaying suit an inexcusable length of time after the patentee knew of 
infringement.100  As for prejudice,101 the challenging companies would 
demonstrate the extensive use of the patented technologies and the effects 
that unpredicted licensing fees would have on the electronic commerce 
industry.102 
¶40 Commerce One employees could also testify regarding the first 
factor of estoppel: that Commerce One specifically intended for the public 
to use the patents without paying licensing fees and that they communicated 
this to the public.103  If JGR were now allowed to enforce the patents, 
Commerce One’s prior communications would have been misleading.104  
The last two factors, reliance and prejudice,105 would be similar to the proof 
for the last factor of laches.  Although it would be an equitable 
determination and the judge could place more weight on specific factors, it 
does not appear there is any evidence that would support a finding of 
validity.  
¶41 Turning to the cotton gin example, it does not appear there would 
be any opportunity for third parties to present evidence Whitney was not 
attempting to enforce his patents.  Any purchaser could simply point to all 
                                                     
98 As in most cases where a valuable or controversial patent is sold, the public 
notice by the PTO would likely not be necessary because the potentially affected 
parties would already know of the sale. 
99 Slind-Flor, supra note 12. 
100 See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 
1032 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
101 See id. 
102 Admittedly, IBM and Microsoft are not the most sympathetic challengers, but 
there are likely smaller users as well. 
103 See Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
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the litigation associated with the patent.  The sixty filed lawsuits would 
likely be sufficient evidence to prove that Whitney was vigorously trying to 
enforce his rights under the patent.  The patent purchaser would only have 
to pay the fee for the sale review and he could then enforce his rights to the 
cotton gin. 
CONCLUSION 
¶42 Since more and more patents are being granted and used 
strategically, there is widespread concern that some patent holders might be 
stifling innovation through troll-like behavior.  In order to limit troll-like 
behavior, there must be an alternative to costly litigation that could 
invalidate patents that are used improperly. The solution must make an 
effective balance between competition and patent rights so that neither 
commerce nor innovation suffers unduly.   
¶43 The PTO should achieve this balance by making a preliminary 
determination regarding patent enforcement practices whenever a patent is 
renewed or sold.  In cases where the PTO determines there is not sufficient 
evidence to show consistent enforcement, third parties would then present 
evidence and challenge the patent’s validity in an open review procedure.  If 
the challengers are successful in proving the elements of laches and 
estoppel, then the patent would be invalidated. 
¶44 Requiring an open review would reduce instances of patent troll-
like behavior without placing too much of a burden on holders of legitimate 
patents.  Troll-like behavior would decrease because patents would lose 
some of their strength as a strategic weapon.  At the same time, valid 
patents would become more valuable, either to the patentee or to a 
legitimate purchaser.  Innovation would increase, and technology that 
should belong to the public would not be available for exploitation by patent 
trolls.  
 
